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Explaining Gubernatorial Stability 
in Iowa: 
A Review Essay  
and Author’s Response 
Review Essay by James C. Larew* 
Gubernatorial Stability in Iowa: A Stranglehold on Power, by Christopher W. 
Larimer. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. xii, 164 pp. Tables, graphs, 
charts, notes, appendix, bibliography, index. $67.50 hardcover. 
 
NEAR THE END OF HIS BOOK, Gubernatorial Stability in Iowa: 
A Stranglehold on Power, Christopher W. Larimer poses the question 
that he has attempted to answer: Until Terry Branstad stepped 
down as governor in 2017, Iowans had been governed by just 
four different men for the past 50 years. Why such stability? More 
specifically, “the purpose of this book,” Larimer writes, is “to ex-
plore gubernatorial power in Iowa drawing on established re-
search about the formal and informal powers of governors . . . 
as well as what some scholars have described as the ‘idiosyn-
cratic influences on gubernatorial approval’” (133). 
 For the political scientist, Iowa, a stable place by many mea-
sures, is a fertile place to test hypotheses, an apt venue to address 
the type of question that Larimer’s book attempts to answer—
why has there been such stability in the governor’s office? As if a 
political petri dish, the state provides a relatively steady human 
and institutional laboratory in which to conduct political science 
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experiments, to explore events, to evaluate processes, to test 
theories, and to attempt to isolate and test variables drawn from 
the past half-century of its history. During that time period, Iowa’s 
population of approximately 3 million people, although gradu-
ally growing older and shifting from rural to urban and west to 
east, remains largely unchanged, dispersed among more than 
950 towns and cities located in 99 counties. No one region in Iowa 
dominates others; political organizations are created to face the 
challenges of one election cycle, only to be dissipated immedi-
ately thereafter. No political machines in Iowa determine the 
fates of Iowa office seekers; there are no rotten boroughs to dis-
tort election outcomes. Iowa’s computer-driven, nonpartisan 
method of legislative apportionment virtually eliminates the 
contortions caused by the shenanigans of gerrymandering that 
affect the political cultures of many other states. Finally, even 
though the exercise of executive branch powers by the Gover-
nor’s Office has gradually increased in the past five decades, it is 
also the case that the basic architecture of the state’s constitu-
tional framework has scarcely been altered since a series of fun-
damental reforms occurred in the historic 1965–66 session of the 
Iowa General Assembly.  
 Larimer, associate professor of political science at the Univer-
sity of Northern Iowa, approaches his subject—Iowa’s unusual 
pattern of gubernatorial officeholder longevity—through three 
principal avenues of inquiry, each the focus of a separate chapter. 
First, he reviews “approval data” drawn from data banks assem-
bled by political scientists as applied to Iowa’s past governors. Sec-
ond, he presents interviews with political activists, observers, and 
two of the governors—Thomas J. Vilsack and Branstad—who are 
the focus of his study. Third, he undertakes an original statewide 
study of 188 Iowa voters who were asked, retrospectively, to eval- 
uate the performances of Governors Branstad, Vilsack, and Chet 
Culver. To close his study, Larimer describes potential implica- 
tions of his findings for politicians operating in the Iowa arena and 
points to possible future areas of social scientific research.  
 The author’s approach in analyzing the causes of Iowa’s pat-
tern of gubernatorial longevity is leveraged on one counter-exam-
ple: one-term (2007–2011) Governor Culver’s re-election loss, in 
2010, which established him as only the second Iowa incumbent 
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governor in the last half-century to have lost a re-election bid 
(the other, Republican Governor Norman Erbe, lost to Democrat 
Harold E. Hughes in 1962 after serving for one two-year term). 
All other incumbent governors since Hughes’s election in 1962—
Robert D. Ray, Branstad, Vilsack, and, again, Branstad—were ei-
ther re-elected or chose to retire.1 Given this unique “stranglehold” 
history, a primary goal of Larimer’s is to identify characteristics 
of Governor Culver that may have caused his defeat. 
 To explain Culver’s re-election loss as opposed to the re-elec-
tion victories of others, Larimer first considers, but rejects, eco-
nomic and political constraints: declines in state and national 
economic conditions; increased state unemployment rates when 
compared to national rates; a shared party affiliation between a 
governor and an unpopular sitting president; and whether a gov-
ernor presides over legislative chambers whose partisan majori-
ties are unified or divided. Upon concluding that all recent gov-
ernors faced similar economic and political constraints, Larimer 
turns to his own interviews of political operatives and observers. 
He determines that Culver’s personal characteristics were the 
distinguishing factors that resulted in his singular defeat. 
 Larimer’s conclusion is based on impressionistic interview-
based research he conducted (chap. 3). No set of questions ap-
pears to have been asked of all of the interviewees—or, at least, 
no evidence of that approach is presented. From these inter-
views, however, Larimer concludes that, in Iowa, a governor 
who is perceived to have traits and behaviors that include “work-
ing hard” and “trying” and being “out there” and who has the 
ability to “connect” with voters also achieves a level of what the 
author terms “Iowa comfort.” Many interviewees (some of them 
anonymous) were particularly harsh in their assessment of Cul-
ver’s capacity to “work hard,” and some even pointed to that 
perceived personal shortcoming as the basis for his electoral de-
feat in 2010. By contrast, the author appears to imply, Governor 
Branstad’s re-election in 1986 in the midst of a rural economic 
recession can be attributed to his image as a “hard worker.” 
                                                 
1. Robert Fulton served briefly as governor when Hughes resigned shortly 
before his third term ended so that Hughes could gain a seniority advantage 
over his peers in the U.S. Senate, to which he had just been elected, and Fulton, 
then lieutenant governor, was elevated briefly to the governor’s chair. 
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 This impressionistic phase of Larimer’s research is followed 
by his analysis of his own polling efforts. Starting with approxi-
mately 1,200 voters to whom questionnaires were initially sent, 
Larimer ends up with 188 responses from Iowa voters of a certain 
age (at least old enough to have voted for Branstad, Vilsack, and 
Culver), divided thinly over four separate congressional districts. 
Here, and based on impressions he gained in the interviewing 
process described in chapter three, Larimer creates and explores 
two conceptual gubernatorial capacities: “management powers” 
(related to executive management functions) and “connecting 
powers” (relating to outreach and constituent relations functions). 
Larimer finds that each governor enjoyed favorable ratings by 
those who shared his party affiliation but that among Democrats, 
Vilsack received higher ratings than Culver for “management” 
and “connecting powers.” In an interesting contrast to the inter-
viewees in chapter three, the 188 survey respondents concluded, 
when comparing attributes (“communicate effectively,” “work-
ing hard,” “effort to meet Iowans,” “good representative,” and 
“clear vision”), that the characteristic that least differentiated Cul-
ver, Vilsack, and Branstad was the capacity to “work hard” (118). 
 In summarizing his findings (chap. 5), the author concludes 
that while traditional models of gubernatorial popularity, such 
as economic factors, explain some of the “staying power” of 
Iowa’s governors, “so do perceptions about the governor’s desire 
to work hard on behalf of all Iowans.” “Governors who are per-
ceived as working hard, being out and about around the state,” 
Larimer postulates, “are given some slack during tough eco-
nomic times.” He further conjectures that, while approval ratings 
may decline, “voters are less likely to hold a governor accountable 
at the polls if they hold a favorable impression of that governor’s 
work ethic on behalf of the state” (13). Larimer concludes,  
There is more to it than just correlations between public opinion 
and the “fundamentals” of the political system such as presidential 
approval and aggregate level measures of the economy. For Gover-
nor Culver, there was a clear disconnect between what voters have 
come to expect of their governor and the actions they perceived 
coming out of the Culver administration. . . . Culver . . . didn’t give off 
the perception of liking his job or regularly interacting with voters. 
For an electorate that takes politics very personally and expects 
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“government officials [to be] approachable on a personal basis” . . . 
this was a problem (14). 
 The author concedes, as an aside, that Governor Culver’s loss 
in 2010 was not inconsistent with “existing models” of “guberna-
torial popularity” and may be traced to the impact of events ex-
ternal to Culver’s personality traits, “a remarkable confluence of 
events, including backlash against a 2009 Iowa Supreme Court 
ruling allowing for same sex marriage in Iowa, the Tea Party 
movement, a significant economic downturn and perhaps most 
notable, a challenge from a former governor—an unprecedented 
occurrence in Iowa” (9). Nevertheless, to Larimer, more “uncon-
ventional” or “less easily observed constraints,” such as the ability 
to convey a sense of “Iowa comfort,” principally explain the dif-
ferences between Governors Ray, Branstad, and Vilsack’s respec-
tive abilities to win re-election and Culver’s failure to do so (13). 
 While Larimer’s analysis results in a series of useful observa-
tions about Iowa’s recent political history, it is nevertheless un-
settling that he fails to address in any meaningful way the impact 
of the three most dominating and adverse of the “remarkable 
confluence of events” of the Culver years, the events most apt to 
have challenged Culver’s performance in office and to have 
shaped the public’s opinion of his gubernatorial efforts: (1) the 
Great Flood of 2008; (2) the Great Recession, causing an extra-
ordinary contraction of Iowa’s economy and tax base, starting in 
2009; and (3) adverse public reaction and political response to 
President Barack Obama’s policy initiatives in 2008–2009. 
 Instead of exploring any of these history-bending events in 
his analysis, Larimer proposes that Culver’s predecessors each 
faced challenges similar to Culver’s and yet they, unlike Culver, 
overcame such challenges to win re-election. Given these con-
trasting outcomes, Larimer surmises, something must be “missing 
from existing models of gubernatorial popularity that can help to 
explain this recurrent pattern [of gubernatorial longevity] in 
Iowa” (9). Ultimately, Larimer concludes that Culver’s failure to 
win re-election turned on what might be characterized as “in- 
ternal” factors of political personality (Larimer’s “connecting 
powers”) and style (“management powers”) rather than on the 
profound “external” factors that constitute the currents of history. 
But currents flowing from a “confluence” of these “remarkable” 
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events that evade Larimer’s analysis are the very types of factors 
that can affect electoral outcomes and that, in fact, did influence 
the 2010 gubernatorial election in ways that were at least as 
pronounced. 
 For example, first, the devastating Great Flood of 2008, the 
largest natural disaster in the state’s history, covering more than 
one-third of the state, inflicted its deepest damage in the central 
and eastern Iowa cities and counties whose electoral margins had 
provided Culver’s statewide winning difference in 2006. In June 
2008, the rivers of eastern Iowa rose above their banks, covering 
farmlands, closing transportation routes, and displacing thou-
sands of residents and hundreds of businesses. Water more than 
20 feet deep flowed through downtown Cedar Rapids, as citizens 
battled against the Cedar River’s currents and witnessed the 
ruination of residential, industrial, and business districts. Thirty 
miles away, in Iowa City and Coralville, the Iowa River’s flood-
ing was the most destructive in recorded history, destroying 
businesses, forcing the evacuation of homes, and closing down 
the University of Iowa. Further southeast, where the Cedar and 
Iowa Rivers merge, were sites of unprecedented water levels and 
resulting flood damage.  
 Although the Iowa Governor’s Office is constitutionally lim-
ited in its ability to invoke the powers of government unilaterally, 
Culver, in a series of executive orders, reorganized state govern-
ment agencies to focus state resources on flood mitigation efforts. 
Executive Order No. 7, for example, issued on June 27, 2008, estab-
lished a Task Force to Rebuild Iowa and a new Rebuild Iowa of-
fice. A little later, on November 7, 2008, in Executive Order No. 9, 
Culver broadened and defined state agency powers to coordinate 
federal relief efforts with state agencies. Initially, his visible, activist 
response to flood crises was favorably viewed by Iowa residents. 
 But when the murky flood waters finally receded, largely 
from the state’s most Democratically inclined counties in eastern 
and central Iowa, they left behind more than dark stains of nau- 
seating mud and scattered debris. They also left behind altered 
and chastened views about the relationships of citizens to those 
who governed them. In the days and weeks after the flood waters 
crested, citizens were frequently without power, and even those 
who were not displaced from their homes were deprived of normal 
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routines. Those whose businesses were destroyed or damaged 
were often left without livelihoods. 
 Catastrophic events change lives irrevocably. There are stages 
of disaster response: heroic and adrenalin-filled rescues and 
relief efforts followed by long, painful, anxious periods of recov-
ery. There is a tension that grows between the depth of needs of 
persons in times of danger and what bureaucracies can later de-
liver by way of effective relief. What initially seem to be sudden 
and ruthless acts of God or Nature are translated, later, into ques-
tions about whether government is able to provide desperately 
needed assistance or whether, instead, citizens are at the mercy 
of a broken system, run by people who appear to be indifferent 
to suffering. 
 Ecological trauma is felt in the individual body; it is also 
shared in the body politic. Citizens discover both their own limited 
capacity to provide relief to others and the slow, limited capacity 
of government to address lingering difficulties. In this sense, it is 
a fiction to conceptualize that those devastated by the floods 
were ever in an “after disaster” mode during any of the remaining 
years of the Culver Administration. The impacts of the Great Flood 
were ever-present: they were dispiriting; they were exhausting; 
and, eventually, they took a heavy toll on Governor Culver’s fa-
vorability ratings. 
 The second great event of the Culver years, the Great Reces-
sion of 2008–2010, is barely mentioned by Larimer. It was not a 
mere footnote to history: it was a downward-driving force of his-
tory itself. In the last quarter of 2008—at a time when scarce state 
resources were desperately needed to remediate flood damage—
state revenues started to contract and, on December 22, 2008, 
Governor Culver instituted the first of what would be a series of 
executive orders mandating across-the-board reductions in state 
spending due to shortfalls in tax revenue collections. In Execu-
tive Order No. 10, issued on December 22, 2008, he ordered a 1.5 
percent reduction in spending. But the recessionary pressures 
did not let up; they only intensified. In the months ahead, tax 
revenues would drop precipitously—particularly in those areas 
related to the state’s basic industrial businesses.  
 Within nine months of Culver’s initial across-the-board budget 
cut, in Executive Order No. 18, issued on September 25, 2009, he 
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ordered the transfer of $45.3 million to allow the closure of the 
state’s book for the 2009 fiscal year. And, only a few weeks after 
that, on October 8, 2009, Culver ordered an unprecedented 10 
percent across-the-board cut in all state agencies to cope with the 
deeply reduced collection of taxes. These were unprecedented, 
forceful, activist uses of the governor’s powers, ones that allowed 
government agencies to function in difficult times, but all of them 
resulted, directly or indirectly, in adverse consequences for those 
who worked for and who relied on the delivery of government 
services. In addition to public sector contractions, in the private 
sector, unemployment rates rose across the entire state. Iowa’s 
manufacturing sector, in particular, shrank, throwing blue-collar 
workers out of work and exposing thousands of Iowans—many 
of them residing in the very areas that had been savaged by flood 
waters—to new threats of dispossession of their businesses and 
homes.  
 The third history-bending event, also scarcely alluded to by 
Larimer, involved Iowans’ adverse reactions to Democratic Pres-
ident Barack Obama’s federal policy initiatives. Elected by a ma-
jority of hopeful Iowans in 2008, Obama pushed through what 
would prove to be deeply unpopular federal programs. From In-
auguration Day in 2009 until July 2010, the Obama White House 
oversaw the passage of (1) the stimulus package, the most expen-
sive piece of legislation in American history; (2) the second half 
of the TARP-TALF financial-bailout bill; (3) the Dodd-Frank 
financial regulatory reforms; and (4) the Affordable Care Act, 
otherwise known as Obamacare. Not since 1933 had there been a 
more aggressive legislative and regulatory agenda, and Obama’s 
determined march featured not only $2.7 trillion in new spending 
but also the wholesale revision of the nation’s health-care system. 
It was, for many distressed Iowans, as well as for people living 
in other regions of the nation, too much, too fast, and too soon. 
For others, those perched on the other end of the political spec-
trum, Obama’s program was too little, too slow, and too late. 
Many citizens viewed his advisers as at least in part responsible 
for the deregulation of Wall Street that had caused the Great Re-
cession. Obama was therefore seen by many as bailing out banks 
and investment firms at public expense while demanding too little 
in return—no breakups of the banks, no separations of commercial 
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and investment banking combinations, no meaningful curbs on 
executive pay and bonuses in the finance industry, and too little 
help for homeowners unable to afford mortgage payments on 
houses whose values had collapsed. Thus, in Iowa, the period of 
Culver’s diminishing popularity was also a time of mounting an-
ger and frustration for many—significant numbers of whom had 
been Culver’s earlier supporters. Obama’s federal policies in-
flamed political seethings that would find expression in the 2010 
elections and would foreshadow profound changes in Iowa’s po-
litical landscape (as well as in the nation’s) in the years to follow. 
 Each of these three separate ground-shifting events—the 
Great Flood, the Great Recession, and adverse responses to Dem-
ocratic President Obama’s federal programs—challenged the 
strength and powers of the Governor’s Office itself—to say noth-
ing of Culver’s individual ability to exercise the limited powers 
of that office in response to them. Collectively, the events wove 
together the unique backdrop against which Iowans measured 
Governor Culver’s performance, a backdrop unlike any that had 
draped the administrations of his gubernatorial predecessors in 
the previous 80 years. By failing to address this reality, Larimer’s 
approach to evaluating Iowa’s pattern of gubernatorial longevity 
causes him to suggest that the critical differences between the suc-
cessful re-elections of Hughes, Ray, and Branstad, on the one hand, 
and Culver’s loss in 2010, on the other hand, can be found in a 
comparison of each governor’s respective leadership capacities.  
 A central fact cannot be denied: Governor Culver lost—and 
by a significant margin (53 to 43 percent)—in the 2010 election 
after having won four years earlier by nearly the same margin 
(54 to 44 percent). There was an astonishing cumulative swing in 
the electorate of nearly 20 points in four years. Defining just how, 
when, where, and by which types of voters this erosion princi-
pally occurred can provide some indication as to why it hap-
pened. But these are not the issues that Larimer has chosen to 
explore in any depth.  
 Measurements of public opinion taken in real time and in the 
context of real processes and real events over a course of years 
suggest that the erosion of support was caused more by powerful 
external events than by personality traits unique to Culver. 
Global Strategies Group, a polling operation based in New York 
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City, was retained as Governor Culver’s campaign pollster for 
the 2006 campaign. It continued to perform polling services pe-
riodically thereafter. Those polls, taken repeatedly from May 
2007 through October 2010, provided a constant measuring de-
vice over time. They revealed that Culver enjoyed strong popu-
larity in the opening year of his administration (achieving, in fact, 
higher marks in that year than Governor Branstad ever would 
through November 2010), and, then, built on that strength by his 
visible on-the-ground presence and exercise of executive powers 
in response to the Great Flood. By December 2008, for example—
including months of activism via the issuance of executive orders 
aimed at flood relief efforts—Culver’s approval rating increased 
to 64 percent as a statewide average. This included significantly 
higher approval ratings in the badly flooded Iowa City–Cedar 
Rapids media area (66 percent approval rating) and in northeast 
Iowa counties (69 percent) than in areas less severely affected by 
flooding. Among politically independent male voters, Culver was 
particularly well supported during this time frame (69 percent).  
 Those favorability ratings did not hold, though. In the midst 
of the tiring effects of flood mitigation, in the five-month period 
between December 2008 and May 2009, Culver’s favorability rat-
ings among Iowans flipped and crashed—never to return to the 
higher levels of support, and were subject to continued decline 
thereafter.  
 There is no evidence to suggest that Culver’s personality had 
changed in that short time frame. And it does not seem plausible 
that such factors as “working hard” or “trying” or conveying a 
persona of “Iowa comfort”—concepts developed in Larimer’s 
work—explain the dramatic turn of events. A more likely expla-
nation for the downturn in Culver’s popularity is that his political 
fortunes, at first anchored in residuals of flood relief efforts, were 
increasingly tied to other forces, not the least of which were reces-
sionary pressures that could not be contained by state government 
initiatives. Federal programs launched by a president who shared 
Culver’s political affiliation, ones aimed to alleviate economic suf-
fering caused by the Great Recession, were viewed unfavorably 
by a wide spectrum of Iowa voters. Over the remaining years of 
Culver’s administration, as opposition to President Obama’s eco-
nomic policies grew, Culver’s political fortunes waned.  
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 All of this coincided with insurgent political energies that arose 
from multiple points on the political spectrum, forms of expres-
sion sometimes collectively known as the Tea Party movement. 
That insurgency found its most immediate political expression in 
the 2010 mid-term elections. At the federal level, it would cost 
the Democrats 63 House seats, the largest such defeat in 72 years. 
At state houses, more than 600 legislative seats would change 
hands from Democrats to Republicans. And, in Iowa, the longevity 
string of successful gubernatorial incumbent re-elections would 
be broken. 
 Can it credibly be argued that Culver’s demise was caused by 
his failure to meet challenges that were comparable to those faced 
by his predecessors, by an electorate that found him wanting in 
the exercise of “management powers” and “connecting powers” 
when facing those challenges? It would seem more convincing to 
argue that the 2010 election marked less a public measure of Gov-
ernor Culver’s character traits, as the Larimer study suggests, than 
that it represented a “stress test” on Iowa’s political culture. That 
test challenged foundational concepts ranging from the state’s 
longstanding tradition of gubernatorial longevity (by voting Cul-
ver out of office) to citizens’ normal deference to the state’s judici-
ary (by voting out of office, in the 2010 election, for the first time 
in the state’s history, three supreme court justices, a response to 
that court’s controversial ruling finding same-gender marriage to 
be constitutionally protected). And, as subsequent election cycles 
would show, Iowa’s 2010 political stress test would be only the 
first of a series of such tests, experienced first in other states and 
then in the 2012 presidential election, almost all of them related in 
some way to the Obama administration and ultimately resulting, 
six years later, in 2016, in the advent of Trumpism.  
 Culver’s 2010 gubernatorial loss reflected, in large part, the 
deep erosion of his political support in those areas of central and 
eastern Iowa where, in 2006, he had received some of his strong-
est backing but that had been most adversely affected by the 
combined traumas of the Great Flood, the Great Recession, and 
adverse reactions to Obama’s federal initiatives. When com-
paring Culver’s margins of victory and margins of defeat on a 
county-by-county basis, the adverse shifts in these areas were 
particularly remarkable. 
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 In retrospect, Culver’s 2010 loss would also serve as a prem-
onition, the cutting edge of a six-year wave of Democratic Party 
officeholder attrition during which there would be other losses, 
including a 35 percent reduction in the number of Democratic 
governors elected to office. Seen in that vein, Culver’s re-election 
loss, his breaking of Iowa’s gubernatorial “stranglehold of power,” 
was not a referendum on the personality or style of a particular 
person holding that office at a particular moment in time; rather, 
the election result placed a point on a graph and joined a trend 
line that had started a year before and that would continue 
through the remaining Obama years.  
 In 2009 Democrats held 31 governorships. By the end of 
Obama’s presidency, they would hold only 17. By then, too, Re-
publicans would control all levels of government in 25 states. In 
a manner unprecedented in American history, during the Obama 
presidency more than 1,100 Democratic elected state legislative 
officeholders would lose their jobs to Republicans. At the federal 
level, by 2016, Republican majorities would control both cham-
bers of Congress and the presidency itself, captured by the most 
unlikely Republican candidate of them all: Donald J Trump. 
 In light of these factors, it can and must be conceded that 
Christopher Larimer has added valuable insights into how Io-
wans perceive their governor and how, under normal conditions, 
those who seek or who hold that office might conduct themselves 
to obtain and to hold the support of the voting public. However, 
it must also be said that any comparative analyses made about 
the performance of any one Iowa governor, as compared to the 
performances of others, must involve a careful scrutiny of funda-
mental premises and must not oversimplify or distort the chal-
lenging context in which any such person privileged to serve in 
that office has exercised its powers and duties. 
 
Response by Christopher W. Larimer 
I appreciate James Larew’s review of my research on Iowa gov-
ernors, particularly given his own record of involvement in the 
highest levels of state government. For those interested in a his-
torical account of modern party competition in Iowa, I recom-
mend Larew’s book, The Party Reborn, which discusses how key 
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figures such as Harold Hughes and John Culver revitalized the 
modern Democratic Party in Iowa. 
 Larew’s main point of contention is that I put too much em-
phasis, or place too much blame, on Governor Culver’s personal 
attributes, ignoring other seemingly obvious environmental 
factors. On several occasions, Larew refers to my analysis as “im- 
pressionistic” and speculative, as well as a significant departure 
from political reality. This critique is inaccurate for three reasons. 
First, my analysis is not based on a reading of Culver personally 
but rather perceived differences between Culver and his predeces-
sors as indicated by Iowa voters and nearly two dozen longtime 
observers of Iowa politics. Larew writes that my analysis shows 
that “Culver’s personal characteristics were the distinguishing 
factors that resulted in his singular defeat.” That is a misunder-
standing of my analysis. As I write very clearly in the conclusion,  
“It may very well have been that Governor Culver was doing as much 
as (or more than) Branstad or Vilsack, but the perception was that he 
was not” (134, italics added). 
 Second, my conclusions derive from an evidence-based ap-
proach to understanding gubernatorial popularity. As I discuss 
in this response, most of the shortcomings described by Larew 
are covered and controlled for in the statistical analyses pre-
sented in chapters 2 and 4 and the appendix of my book.  
 Third, and perhaps most damning, Larew’s critique suggests 
that my interpretation of the findings exceeds the bounds of the 
data. As this response will attempt to make clear, that is not the 
case as my conclusions are well situated within the parameters 
of the data. 
 Larew is highly critical of what he calls the “impressionistic 
phase” of my research, specifically the results from interviews I 
conducted with longtime observers of Iowa politics. Larew 
writes, “No set of questions appears to have been asked of all of 
the interviewees—or, at least, no evidence of that approach is 
presented.” Table A3.1 in the appendix does, in fact, include the 
set of questions that were asked of all interviewees, the purpose of 
which was to provide a formal comparison across all responses. 
 The second half of Larew’s essay focuses on three alternative 
explanations for Culver’s defeat in 2010: the flood of 2008, the 
Great Recession of 2008–2010, and the backlash to President 
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Obama’s policy agenda. Larew argues that the combination of 
these factors contributed to Culver’s defeat and that my analysis 
ignores their overwhelming influence. I agree with Larew that 
such factors are important to consider; however, the linear mod-
els presented in chapter 2 directly address and account for two 
of these factors while the third is inconclusive.  
 First, the regression model in table 2.4 on page 55 casts doubt 
on the claim that economics and presidential politics are solely to 
blame for Culver’s defeat. My purpose for writing the book was 
to try to understand whether there was something unique about 
the way voters perceived Governor Culver compared to Gover-
nors Ray, Branstad, and Vilsack. As a political scientist, I was also 
interested in testing whether traditional explanations for guber-
natorial popularity, such as state economic factors and shared 
party affiliation with an unpopular president, applied to Iowa 
governors. The model shown in table 2.4 controls for all three sets 
of factors. Specifically, and critical to addressing Larew’s claims, 
I included three binary variables for Governors Ray, Branstad, 
and Vilsack. Governor Culver is left out as the comparison gov-
ernor. If these three variables are significant and in the same di-
rection, then it would suggest that there is an independent and 
unobserved effect beyond economics or politics for each of these 
three governors compared to Governor Culver. Indeed, that is 
exactly what the model shows, as the coefficients for all three var-
iables are significant and positive. In other words, the coefficients 
are telling us that even when controlling for federal and relative 
unemployment, as well as shared party affiliation with the pres-
ident, which is tied to ups and downs in presidential approval, 
just being Robert Ray, Terry Branstad, or Tom Vilsack is corre-
lated with significantly higher approval ratings compared to Chet 
Culver. That is the case even when accounting for changes in fed-
eral and state unemployment rates and presidential approval. 
This is precisely the point of doing the interviews, to understand 
what is causing the approval ratings of Ray, Branstad, and Vil-
sack to be significantly higher than for Culver, as the data suggest 
that it is not economics or politics. On this last point, this indi- 
cates that even if Obama’s policy agenda “inflamed political 
seethings,” as Larew writes, the model shows that some other 
factor, not yet considered, significantly affected gubernatorial 
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approval ratings between governors. Likewise, if it is economic 
frustration that turns voters away from Iowa governors, the two 
economic variables in table 2.4 should have consumed more of 
the variance in the model, rendering the three binary variables 
for individual governors insignificant. That was not the case.  
 On the economy, I would add that figure 1.2 on page 28 shows 
that the correlation between approval ratings and unemployment 
rates was strong and significant (and negative) for both Governor 
Vilsack and Governor Culver. To Larew’s point, the negative cor-
relations for Culver were greater than for Vilsack, but only mar-
ginally so for state unemployment (0.10). Since research has shown 
that voters tend to think about state economic factors more so than 
national economic factors when voting for governor, the marginal 
difference between the two governors suggests that Culver was 
not punished unusually for downturns in the state’s economy.  
 On Larew’s second point, if voters were that upset with Pres-
ident Obama’s policies, that should have shown up in the indi-
vidual approval ratings model for Governor Culver in table 2.6 
on page 63. The variable for presidential approval, while nega-
tive, is not significant. As such, Larew’s argument that bad feel-
ings toward President Obama’s agenda in 2010 directly contrib-
uted to Culver’s defeat is not supported by the empirical evi-
dence presented in the chapter. I do agree with Larew that re-
sentment toward Obama in 2010 existed, and that the Tea Party 
movement likely exacerbated such resentment toward Demo-
cratic candidates generally at the time, but at least as measured 
by presidential approval, I do not find evidence showing that this 
affected Culver’s popularity. 
 In short, Larew’s statement that I have not explored these is-
sues “in any depth” is not supported by the analyses presented 
throughout chapter 2. In fact, footnotes 11–15 on pages 72–75 
discuss the many variations and iterations tested for predicting 
changes in gubernatorial popularity. The results presented in the 
chapter are highly robust and hold across model variations.  
 One final note on the statistical aspects of gubernatorial pop-
ularity. Larew’s point about declining favorability in key counties 
in the months after the 2008 flood are well taken, but suggesting 
that declining support and turnout in those counties can be di-
rectly attributed to flood-related issues or “recessionary pressures” 
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risks making an ecological fallacy—using aggregate level data to 
make assumptions about individuals. It may have been the case 
that some voters fit with Larew’s categorization, but the data, to 
my knowledge, do not exist to empirically support his claim. 
Polling from within campaigns such as that from Global Strate-
gies Group cited by Larew can be useful but should always be 
treated with caution until full details about voter selection and 
randomization are known. 
 Larew’s second main criticism is that my analysis is one-
sided, that the perceived shortcomings on what I call “connect-
ing powers” are the primary explanation for Culver’s defeat. I 
devote considerable attention to other factors that likely com-
bined with a perceived weakness on connecting with voters. The 
two most notable, which Larew fails to discuss, are the strength 
of the challenger and the dangers of unified control. Opponent 
strength is discussed at length on pages 34–37 and 98–101, and 
table 1.3 shows that Culver’s re-election bid was unprecedented 
in this regard. I would also direct the reader to the quote from 
Dean Borg on page 101, who said that against “a very weak Re-
publican, Culver might have been reelected.” A perceived ability 
to connect with voters matters, but so does the strength of your 
opponent. Culver was also tasked with dealing with unified state 
government, and as research as shown, when times are bad, the 
chief executive tends to be the focus of the public’s ire. Neither 
Branstad nor Vilsack had to deal with unified party control for 
an extended period of time (Vilsack never had to). 
 Finally, in terms of the results from my statewide survey of 
Iowa voters, I agree with Larew that the response rate of 12.5 per-
cent and resulting sample size of 188 voters was less than ideal. 
However, his critique and dismissal of the data ignore two crucial 
statistical components of my analysis. First, while the response 
rate was low, the entire universe of voters from which the sample 
was drawn included all active voters in the state as provided in 
the official voter file from the Iowa Secretary of State’s office. 
From there, 375 voters within each district were randomly se-
lected to be sent a survey, for a total of 1,500 potential respond-
ents (not 1,200 as Larew stated). The randomization was done 
such that within each congressional district those selected to re-
ceive a survey did not differ from those not selected on several 
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important traits pertaining to political behavior, including vote 
history in three previous elections (November 2010, November 
2008, and November 2006), political party identification, sex, age, 
and household size. As shown in table A4.2 in the appendix, 
within each congressional district there were no differences on 
these traits between voters selected to receive the survey and 
those not selected. Multinomial logit tests using those six variables 
to predict selection to receive the survey were also nonsignificant 
in each congressional district. Moreover, between survey re-
spondents and voters selected to receive the survey but who did 
not return it, there were few differences within each district. As 
reported on pages 110–11, these differences are primarily limited 
to turnout in the November 2010 election, and within each dis-
trict, turnout was higher for survey respondents. In other words, 
survey respondents comprise a more active (and likely more po-
litically aware) group of voters. 
 So, despite the small sample and being “divided thinly over 
four congressional districts,” as Larew writes, there is enough 
statistical support to be confident in my ability to generalize to a 
larger electorate regarding differences in what I call “manage-
ment” and “connecting” powers of recent Iowa governors. Ad-
ditional analyses discussed in the conclusion note that the per-
ceived differences between Culver and Vilsack remained even 
after controlling for the observable characteristics of survey re- 
spondents. Finally, the sample of 1,500 active registered voters 
was restricted to voters who voted in the 2012 general election. 
As I wrote in the book, 
The purpose of sampling 2012 voters who also voted in one of two 
recent general elections was to select Iowa voters who are actively 
involved in the political process and presumably pay more atten-
tion to Iowa politics on a regular basis as compared to infrequent 
or intermittent voters. And indeed this was the case as over 90 
percent of respondents indicated they follow “what’s going on in 
government and public affairs” most or some of the time (109).  
Larew writes that the survey evidence discredits the results from 
the interviews since the differences between governors were the 
“least differentiated” on the question of “commitment to working 
hard on a daily basis for the people of Iowa.” Larew is correct that 
of the five “connecting powers” identified in the book, the overall 
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mean range between the three governors is the smallest on this 
question. However, this is somewhat misleading, as this argument 
looks past the fact that the differences between governors are all 
still statistically significant. In fact, between Governor Culver and 
Governor Vilsack the difference is at the .01 level of significance, 
while between Governor Culver and Governor Branstad it is at the 
.05 level of significance. Larew is essentially making a substance 
versus significance argument that does not hold up upon closer 
inspection. An alpha level of .05 is standard in the social sciences. 
Moreover, the true p-values for the differences between governors 
on this question are 0.000 between Culver and Vilsack and 0.011 
between Culver and Branstad. Put another way, the chances of the 
differences being due to random chance are less than 1 in 100 and 
approximately 1 in 100. Technically the odds are different, but so-
cial scientists would likely agree that the chances are minimal in 
both cases. In short, while Larew questions this “retrospective” 
account given by voters, the results are statistically robust. 
 In the concluding paragraph of his essay, Larew suggests 
that my analysis has the potential to both “oversimplify” and 
“distort” the context facing Iowa governors. As I have laid out in 
this essay, that is a misreading of my approach. The statistical 
analyses presented in chapters 2 and 4 show that Culver was 
viewed and perceived differently than other governors, even 
when controlling for factors research has shown to be predictive 
of gubernatorial approval. Put another way, the linear models 
indicate factors beyond presidential politics and the economy af-
fect gubernatorial popularity in Iowa. The interviews suggest 
perceived effort and comfortability may influence how voters 
view the chief executive of the state, and the survey data provide 
a first attempt at measuring those two concepts in the form of my 
“connecting powers” index.  
 In short, I agree with Larew that the atmospherics of the 2010 
gubernatorial election were unusually bad for a Democratic in-
cumbent; in fact, they were unprecedented in Iowa politics. How-
ever, I take issue with Larew’s discounting of my research as “im-
pressionistic.” As I demonstrate here and throughout the book, 
the perceived differences between the three governors, based on 
approval ratings and survey responses, are empirically robust; 
I would point readers to the appendix for complete details. I 
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would also again stress that the book was not based on the per-
sonal attributes of Governor Culver but rather the perceived 
personality traits of recent Iowa governors. The interviews were 
conducted with a consistent set of questions designed to get at 
what variables might be missing from existing research on gu-
bernatorial popularity, and the results suggest that perceived dif-
ferences in visibility and relatability are worthy of further explo-
ration by scholars. I used the concluding chapter to lay out the 
beginnings of what such a theoretical framework might look like 
and encourage state politics scholars and others to think about 
how best to measure related concepts.  
 
